One of the more peculiar aspects of the Australian electoral system is the "preference swap" arrangements that, like under the table deals, have an insidious influence on the outcome. I will explain this electoral quirk briefly. At Federal elections, voters have two options on the Senate ballot: vote one candidate "group" above the line, or vote all candidates, from one to whatever, below the line. In New South Wales, there are over 100 candidates, and to vote below the line, you must number every single candidate (although, there is an exception, where you need only number 90% of candidates below the line to cast a valid ballot). Needless to say, most voters vote 1 above the line. This has the consequence of, effectively, giving your vote to the party you voted for to distribute as they see fit. The caveat being they have to tell us, the voting public, just how that distribution will take place. That is, they must provide "preference flows" in advance of the election.
This past weekend, the Senate preference flows were released; and there were some very unusual preference swaps. Minor parties routinely "swap" preferences so as to maximise their chances of election. Normally, you would assume parties would swap preferences with ideologically sympathetic parties; there are some notable cases where this is, indeed, the case. There are, however, other cases where bizarre preferencing has taken place. Two are worth noting: The Australian Sex and the WikiLeaks Party.
The Sex Party has preferenced the racist One Nation party against the more ideologically sympathetic Greens Party, while the WikiLeaks Party that has preferenced the Shooters Party and the racist Australia First Party ahead of the Greens Party. WikiLeaks and the Sex Party have more in common with the Greens than the other parties mentioned, which makes it bizarre that two ostensibly "libertarian" parties (that is to say, "social" libertarian) have preferenced right-wing parties ahead of their left-wing cohorts. This may be evidence of cynical preference swapping, or spite towards a more prominent left-wing party.
The "defence" provided by the WikiLeaks and Sex Party was galling. The former attributed an "administrative error" to the absurd choice, while the Sex Party offered meekly that they "had to put One Nation somewhere!" Which is true; all parties must allocate full preferences, all 110 of them. The question remains unanswered, however, as to why they put them ahead of a more sympathetic party, like the Greens. It is possibly just cynical preferencing, which is entirely acceptable: we have a system that allows parties to swap preferences, or make preference deals, and all parties are free to do so. If that is the case, however, then they could at least be honest about it. Attempting to obfuscate their true intentions is electoral cowardice.
One could argue, and it has been argued, that these other parties are unlikely to inherit the Sex Party's or WikiLeaks' votes. If that is the case, then it makes it even more ridiculous to preference them ahead of the Greens; it has caused needless consternation among likely voters for those parties. What is really taking place is a gamble. The two parties in question are gambling on the order of elimination, hoping to pick up votes from right-wing minor parties ahead of the Greens. It is, of course, acceptable to want to beat other parties, even parties that are broadly sympathetic. The problem is, however, that sometimes electoral gambles backfire. 2004 in Victoria is a case in point. Family First candidate Steve Fielding was elected to the Senate on Labor and Democrat preferences. The latter two parties had preferenced against the Greens in that state; as a result, an adversarial party was elected as opposed to a sympathetic one.
Other parties have been more principled in the preferencing. The Secular Party has stuck to a sympathetic flow (on a personal note, their preference flow in New South Wales is closest to my below the line vote); while the Pirate Party took a more democratic line, allowing their members to vote on the preference order. Perhaps the strangest preference flow comes from the Shooters Party, which is, quite simply, all over the place and is, at present, unfathomable (at least to this observer).
There are two points I will make in conclusion. First, these kinds of shenanigans have only strengthened my support for Optional Preferential Voting (which would eliminate these very shenanigans!); second, it is ridiculous for minor political parties to preference against their sympathies. The Senate is so finely balanced that counter-intuitive preferencing can throw the Senate out of kilter for up to six years. If the gamble some of these parties have taken backfires, it could lead to antithetical policy directions that undermine their own agenda, and the agenda of progressive politics more broadly.
Showing posts with label ALP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ALP. Show all posts
Sunday, 18 August 2013
Wednesday, 7 August 2013
"Voting For": Against Electoral Cowardice
There's no such thing as a "vote against" a party or candidate; there is only a "vote for." You must vote for someone. To vote is an inherently positive thing; it has no negative or negating qualities. It is, as such, disingenuous to encourage others to vote against a party or candidate; it is patently not what occurs in the act of voting. The tension within this for/against dichotomy is most acute in two-party electoral systems. To vote against one party is, to put it simplistically, to vote for the other party. The peculiarities of the Australian electoral further exacerbate this for/against dichotomy.
At the Federal level, compulsory preferential voting is used. To put it briefly, every candidate on the ballot must be numbered, meaning that, even if you don't "vote 1" for either of the major parties, you must put one before the other in the number sequence or your vote doesn't count. So you end up having to vote Coalition or Labor in the end if you want your vote to count at all. I'm not going to debate the merits of the electoral system here, but the system highlights the importance of understanding that to vote is an inherently positive act; positive, that is, in that it must be given to someone (a party or candidate), it is never taken away. Mathematically speaking, voting is an act of addition, not subtraction.
I say it is disingenuous to encourage a misunderstanding of the act of voting, but I would go further and argue that it is a form of cowardice. Recently, the Sydney Telegraph used its front page to call for the Labor party to be kicked out, the title screamed "Kick This Mob Out!" (Read related story here.) Other pundits have expressed a similar sentiment. But a vote against Labor must be a vote for the Coalition, yet it is not often couched in such explicit terms. Perhaps it is out of fear of losing credibility by explicitly endorsing a party or candidate, a vain attempt at retaining some degree of objectivity. Once you endorse a party or candidate everything you say subsequently will be viewed through that prism; not only that, such an endorsement is an acknowledgement that your subsequent words will and can be viewed through that prism. There is no defence or deflection once you have acknowledged your bias, and this can be seen as giving up a strategic advantage.
It is cowardice to encourage a vote against a party, especially in a system where voting is compulsory and the form of voting is as onerous as ours. It is no bad thing to support or endorse a particular party, but when it is obfuscated in the manner that it so often is, behind outrage and indignation directed towards that other party, it is dishonest. If you wish to support a party then positively endorse them, because that is ultimately what voting is: a binding endorsement of a particular party, not a dis-endorsement of any other party.
At the Federal level, compulsory preferential voting is used. To put it briefly, every candidate on the ballot must be numbered, meaning that, even if you don't "vote 1" for either of the major parties, you must put one before the other in the number sequence or your vote doesn't count. So you end up having to vote Coalition or Labor in the end if you want your vote to count at all. I'm not going to debate the merits of the electoral system here, but the system highlights the importance of understanding that to vote is an inherently positive act; positive, that is, in that it must be given to someone (a party or candidate), it is never taken away. Mathematically speaking, voting is an act of addition, not subtraction.
I say it is disingenuous to encourage a misunderstanding of the act of voting, but I would go further and argue that it is a form of cowardice. Recently, the Sydney Telegraph used its front page to call for the Labor party to be kicked out, the title screamed "Kick This Mob Out!" (Read related story here.) Other pundits have expressed a similar sentiment. But a vote against Labor must be a vote for the Coalition, yet it is not often couched in such explicit terms. Perhaps it is out of fear of losing credibility by explicitly endorsing a party or candidate, a vain attempt at retaining some degree of objectivity. Once you endorse a party or candidate everything you say subsequently will be viewed through that prism; not only that, such an endorsement is an acknowledgement that your subsequent words will and can be viewed through that prism. There is no defence or deflection once you have acknowledged your bias, and this can be seen as giving up a strategic advantage.
It is cowardice to encourage a vote against a party, especially in a system where voting is compulsory and the form of voting is as onerous as ours. It is no bad thing to support or endorse a particular party, but when it is obfuscated in the manner that it so often is, behind outrage and indignation directed towards that other party, it is dishonest. If you wish to support a party then positively endorse them, because that is ultimately what voting is: a binding endorsement of a particular party, not a dis-endorsement of any other party.
Thursday, 13 June 2013
Political Contagion and the Alternating Trend in State and Federal Politics in Australia
It's often heard after a State election: "this election was a referendum on the Federal government!" Surely, you've heard it at least once. There's an underlying premise to this statement, however, that needs to be brought to the surface. The premise is this: the party in power at a Federal level has lost the State election in question. This is actually a common occurrence, and has been over the last 40 years. The party in power at a Federal level usually loses elections at a State level. This was particularly pronounced under John Howard.
There is a clear trend between State and Federal election results to suggest there is some kind of contagion that influences the political cycle in this country. Indeed, I would say it is central to the modern political cycle. Our "Federalist" system provides a bulwark, however malignant it may sometimes get, against the excesses of the Commonwealth. The trend of swapping parties at the State level may simply be an expression of the general anti-incumbency felt throughout the electorate. But I'm getting speculative at this point. Let's talk about trends. The modern trend of alternating the parties at a State in contrast with the Federal level can be seen to start during the Whitlam era.
The nation had just emerged from 24-odd years of conservative rule. The State-Federal alternating cycle was somewhat in effect during the Menzies era; with the exception of South Australia up until the mid-60s, whose electoral cycle was severely stunted by entrenched gerrymandering; a similar fate would befall Queensland at a later date. Menzies' unprecedented success was assisted by the Labor Party's internal problems, surrounding Communism in particular, which resulted in the rise of the Democratic Labor Party, who helped the Menzies Liberal Party retain power for so long.
I hold to the view that Australian politics is largely governed by a cycle; we have two major parties and every now and then they swap seats. This cyclical process is a common feature of two-party electoral systems around the world. The best a political party can hope for is to extend their time in the big chairs, and contract the time their opponents get. In Australia, there is a general trend to give the governing party at least two terms in office. Whitlam only served the equivalent of one term (three years), but did, in fact, win two elections (1972 and 1974). Generally speaking, we can say that the party that wins office from opposition always retains government at the next election.
With few exceptions, Whitlam being perhaps the most high profile, the trend in Australia politics has been towards stability, and, as such, longevity. The only other one-termer, since the Deakin-Fischer-Cook merry-go-round (we might include Hughes here, but he was a merry-go-round unto himself!), was James Scullin's Labor government during the Great Depression. Scullin's government was actually shorter than Whitlam's. The alternating State/Federal trend, however, is really a product of Menzies' longevity, which is why we may take as a starting point the rise and fall of the Whitlam Labor government: Whitlam's victory marks the end of the old cycle.
The trend, however, begins to take shape during the Fraser period; State Labor governments start to emerge toward the back-end of that period. Neville Wran's New South Wales Labor government, which won office in 1976, is the major exception here. Tasmania, under John Bannon, would remain a Labor State for almost all of the Fraser period. It wouldn't be until 1982, however, that the remaining Liberal states would fall in quick succession. Queensland, during this period, is another exception because of what is often referred to as the "Bjelkemander." Although the gerrymandering in Queensland had begun before Joh Bjelke-Peterson's assumption to the Premiership.
During the Hawke-Keating era Liberal governments start to emerge "mid-term" in the late-80s with State Liberal/Coalition victories, starting with Nick Greiner in New South Wales in 1988, and then in quick succession with Jeff Kennett in Victoria in 1992, Ray Groom in Tasmania also in 1992, Richard Court in Western Australia in 1993, and Dean Brown in South Australia also in 1993. Queensland at this time is still an exception; in 1989 Wayne Goss will break more than 30 years of conservative rule. It won't be for another 10 years before Queensland's State results start to reflect the alternating trend.
During the Howard years, this trend becomes more pronounced. Bob Carr would win in New South Wales in 1995, the year prior to Howard taking office (Carr's electoral success is partly explained by the collapse of the Fahey Liberal government); then in 1998 Tasmania and Queensland would fall to Jim Bacon and Peter Beattie, respectively; in 1999 Victoria would fall to Steve Bracks, with Western Australia 2001 to Geoff Gallop and South Australia in 2002 to Mike Rann. The Liberal/Coalition would not win another State election until 2008 in Western Australia, the year after the Howard government fell, and this was, technically, a hung parliament.
Subsequent to Kevin Rudd's victory in 2007, Labor would win State elections in Queensland in 2009, under Anna Bligh, and in South Australia under Mike Rann, and Tasmania under David Bartlett in 2010. Although the Tasmania election was, technically, a hung parliament. The Coalition, however, would win State victories in 2010 in Victoria under Ted Ballieu; 2011 in New South Wales under Barry O'Farrell; and 2012 in Queensland under Campbell Newman. The last two were particularly massive victories. Colin Barnett would also win a second term in Western Australia in 2013.
It is important to note two things about this period: first, Kevin Rudd would be replaced in 2010 as Prime Minister by Julia Gillard; and second, the 2010 Federal election would result in a hung parliament, the first federally since the Second World War. This event can be seen to have had an effect on the results at a State level, particularly in New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia. However, it should be remembered that New South Wales had been governed by the Labor Party for 16 years, while Queensland had been governed, with the exception of the Borbidge government from 1996-98, had been under Labor for 20-odd years.
The longevity of State governments must be given more significance than any contagion from the Federal arena. Having said that, the alternating trend is not only clear but growing more pronounced. It is widely argued that Howard's protracted presence was a millstone for State Liberal Parties. It is further argued that Labor's currently "toxic" presence at a Federal level is damaging the prospects of State Labor. This is perhaps most obvious in Western Australia, where a commensurately popular Labor leader not only failed to win government, but actually lost seats. It should be noted, Colin Barnett is also relatively well-liked, and the general rule of thumb that governments get a second-term also applies.
It is Labor's toxic Federal influence that will ultimately give the Liberal Party dominance across both levels of government. Should Labor lose government in September, as seems likely, it will be followed in 2014 by likely losses in Tasmania and South Australia. Again, it should be remembered that both these states have been governed by Labor for more than a decade. Labor will be without a Federal or State government (not counting Territories) in 2014. The Victorian State election is due in late 2014; this will be a winnable election, but the contagion may not have dissipated by this time. Conversely, Tony Abbott's contagion may not yet have set in. The State is also, technically in a hung parliament, and the Liberal party recently replaced a first-term Premier. It will be the election to watch in 2014. But, of course, we're getting ahead of ourselves.
What can we take from these facts? There are a couple of things: first, governments tend to get a second-term. Second, the alternating trend doesn't tend to quicken until the second-term of a Federal government. That is to say, when States fall, then tend to fall in quick succession, but they don't tend to fall in the first-term of a new Federal government. This latter point, however, was more pronounced under the Hawke-Keating government than under the subsequent Howard government.
It is highly unlikely, as such, that Labor will win in either New South Wales (in 2015), or Queensland (also likely in 2015, all other things being equal), and the contagion from Federal Labor, or the general alternating trend, may be too strong to save them in Tasmania and South Australia, even in Victoria. Western Australia is not due for another State election until 2017, which would be the theoretical second-term for an Abbott government.
One can certainly argue that there is no strict causal link between Federal and State elections; in general, I think that's correct. But it would be naïve to suggest that there is no causal link at all; it may, of course, be a correlative link. The alternating trend does not indicate either way. The trend, however, is there. And that trend, at the very least, is indicative of an electoral cycle that encompasses both State and Federal governments. Can any predictions be made based on this trend? Sure, but only general, long-term ones.
Based on current events, the Labor party will be in the Federal wilderness from September, and based on the "second-term principle" are unlikely to return to the big chairs until 2019 at the earliest. Labor is also unlike to return to power in Queensland and New South Wales until at least 2018 and 2019, respectively; the margins in both these states are just too big to unseat two first-term governments in 2015. Victoria remains the only winnable State between now and 2017, but Labor would need to unseat a first-term government, and even with the Baillieu-Napthine debacle, that would still be very difficult. Tasmania and South Australia will likely fall in 2014, and won't be re-contested until 2018.
2018-19, then, is the period where any real resurgence will come; there is also a convergence of elections around this time, and, what is more, a Federal Coalition government will be in its second-term, as will most State governments. Now, I believe that ultimately the political cycle will prevail; eventually, governments will change hands. It is a question for the Liberals how long they can extend the cycle, and for Labor how quickly they can contract the Liberal's time in office. Neither is fully in control of events that may benefit them or adversely affect them, and neither is fully in control of their political capital.
The Labor party, as such, will be in the wilderness for sometime. Hopefully, they use that time to reconnect with voters, and engage a bit of internal party reform; otherwise, they may find themselves in the wilderness again very quickly after the alternating trend eventually "flips" in their favour again. That this Labor government will be the first government not to win a third election since Whitlam will cause a disruption in the alternating trend. Since Whitlam, every government has gotten at least a third-term, and this is the major contributing factor to the trend. If any in-coming Liberal government fails to go beyond two-terms, then the trend will change, for at least a decade, to one of corresponding, and not alternating.
This is all hypothetical, of course, but it bears remembering that politics is not just about today, or the next election; our politics, just like our lives, exists in a continuum, and understanding the rhythms and patterns of that continuum is useful for contextualising individual events or phenomena.
There is a clear trend between State and Federal election results to suggest there is some kind of contagion that influences the political cycle in this country. Indeed, I would say it is central to the modern political cycle. Our "Federalist" system provides a bulwark, however malignant it may sometimes get, against the excesses of the Commonwealth. The trend of swapping parties at the State level may simply be an expression of the general anti-incumbency felt throughout the electorate. But I'm getting speculative at this point. Let's talk about trends. The modern trend of alternating the parties at a State in contrast with the Federal level can be seen to start during the Whitlam era.
The nation had just emerged from 24-odd years of conservative rule. The State-Federal alternating cycle was somewhat in effect during the Menzies era; with the exception of South Australia up until the mid-60s, whose electoral cycle was severely stunted by entrenched gerrymandering; a similar fate would befall Queensland at a later date. Menzies' unprecedented success was assisted by the Labor Party's internal problems, surrounding Communism in particular, which resulted in the rise of the Democratic Labor Party, who helped the Menzies Liberal Party retain power for so long.
I hold to the view that Australian politics is largely governed by a cycle; we have two major parties and every now and then they swap seats. This cyclical process is a common feature of two-party electoral systems around the world. The best a political party can hope for is to extend their time in the big chairs, and contract the time their opponents get. In Australia, there is a general trend to give the governing party at least two terms in office. Whitlam only served the equivalent of one term (three years), but did, in fact, win two elections (1972 and 1974). Generally speaking, we can say that the party that wins office from opposition always retains government at the next election.
With few exceptions, Whitlam being perhaps the most high profile, the trend in Australia politics has been towards stability, and, as such, longevity. The only other one-termer, since the Deakin-Fischer-Cook merry-go-round (we might include Hughes here, but he was a merry-go-round unto himself!), was James Scullin's Labor government during the Great Depression. Scullin's government was actually shorter than Whitlam's. The alternating State/Federal trend, however, is really a product of Menzies' longevity, which is why we may take as a starting point the rise and fall of the Whitlam Labor government: Whitlam's victory marks the end of the old cycle.
The trend, however, begins to take shape during the Fraser period; State Labor governments start to emerge toward the back-end of that period. Neville Wran's New South Wales Labor government, which won office in 1976, is the major exception here. Tasmania, under John Bannon, would remain a Labor State for almost all of the Fraser period. It wouldn't be until 1982, however, that the remaining Liberal states would fall in quick succession. Queensland, during this period, is another exception because of what is often referred to as the "Bjelkemander." Although the gerrymandering in Queensland had begun before Joh Bjelke-Peterson's assumption to the Premiership.
During the Hawke-Keating era Liberal governments start to emerge "mid-term" in the late-80s with State Liberal/Coalition victories, starting with Nick Greiner in New South Wales in 1988, and then in quick succession with Jeff Kennett in Victoria in 1992, Ray Groom in Tasmania also in 1992, Richard Court in Western Australia in 1993, and Dean Brown in South Australia also in 1993. Queensland at this time is still an exception; in 1989 Wayne Goss will break more than 30 years of conservative rule. It won't be for another 10 years before Queensland's State results start to reflect the alternating trend.
During the Howard years, this trend becomes more pronounced. Bob Carr would win in New South Wales in 1995, the year prior to Howard taking office (Carr's electoral success is partly explained by the collapse of the Fahey Liberal government); then in 1998 Tasmania and Queensland would fall to Jim Bacon and Peter Beattie, respectively; in 1999 Victoria would fall to Steve Bracks, with Western Australia 2001 to Geoff Gallop and South Australia in 2002 to Mike Rann. The Liberal/Coalition would not win another State election until 2008 in Western Australia, the year after the Howard government fell, and this was, technically, a hung parliament.
Subsequent to Kevin Rudd's victory in 2007, Labor would win State elections in Queensland in 2009, under Anna Bligh, and in South Australia under Mike Rann, and Tasmania under David Bartlett in 2010. Although the Tasmania election was, technically, a hung parliament. The Coalition, however, would win State victories in 2010 in Victoria under Ted Ballieu; 2011 in New South Wales under Barry O'Farrell; and 2012 in Queensland under Campbell Newman. The last two were particularly massive victories. Colin Barnett would also win a second term in Western Australia in 2013.
It is important to note two things about this period: first, Kevin Rudd would be replaced in 2010 as Prime Minister by Julia Gillard; and second, the 2010 Federal election would result in a hung parliament, the first federally since the Second World War. This event can be seen to have had an effect on the results at a State level, particularly in New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia. However, it should be remembered that New South Wales had been governed by the Labor Party for 16 years, while Queensland had been governed, with the exception of the Borbidge government from 1996-98, had been under Labor for 20-odd years.
The longevity of State governments must be given more significance than any contagion from the Federal arena. Having said that, the alternating trend is not only clear but growing more pronounced. It is widely argued that Howard's protracted presence was a millstone for State Liberal Parties. It is further argued that Labor's currently "toxic" presence at a Federal level is damaging the prospects of State Labor. This is perhaps most obvious in Western Australia, where a commensurately popular Labor leader not only failed to win government, but actually lost seats. It should be noted, Colin Barnett is also relatively well-liked, and the general rule of thumb that governments get a second-term also applies.
It is Labor's toxic Federal influence that will ultimately give the Liberal Party dominance across both levels of government. Should Labor lose government in September, as seems likely, it will be followed in 2014 by likely losses in Tasmania and South Australia. Again, it should be remembered that both these states have been governed by Labor for more than a decade. Labor will be without a Federal or State government (not counting Territories) in 2014. The Victorian State election is due in late 2014; this will be a winnable election, but the contagion may not have dissipated by this time. Conversely, Tony Abbott's contagion may not yet have set in. The State is also, technically in a hung parliament, and the Liberal party recently replaced a first-term Premier. It will be the election to watch in 2014. But, of course, we're getting ahead of ourselves.
What can we take from these facts? There are a couple of things: first, governments tend to get a second-term. Second, the alternating trend doesn't tend to quicken until the second-term of a Federal government. That is to say, when States fall, then tend to fall in quick succession, but they don't tend to fall in the first-term of a new Federal government. This latter point, however, was more pronounced under the Hawke-Keating government than under the subsequent Howard government.
It is highly unlikely, as such, that Labor will win in either New South Wales (in 2015), or Queensland (also likely in 2015, all other things being equal), and the contagion from Federal Labor, or the general alternating trend, may be too strong to save them in Tasmania and South Australia, even in Victoria. Western Australia is not due for another State election until 2017, which would be the theoretical second-term for an Abbott government.
One can certainly argue that there is no strict causal link between Federal and State elections; in general, I think that's correct. But it would be naïve to suggest that there is no causal link at all; it may, of course, be a correlative link. The alternating trend does not indicate either way. The trend, however, is there. And that trend, at the very least, is indicative of an electoral cycle that encompasses both State and Federal governments. Can any predictions be made based on this trend? Sure, but only general, long-term ones.
Based on current events, the Labor party will be in the Federal wilderness from September, and based on the "second-term principle" are unlikely to return to the big chairs until 2019 at the earliest. Labor is also unlike to return to power in Queensland and New South Wales until at least 2018 and 2019, respectively; the margins in both these states are just too big to unseat two first-term governments in 2015. Victoria remains the only winnable State between now and 2017, but Labor would need to unseat a first-term government, and even with the Baillieu-Napthine debacle, that would still be very difficult. Tasmania and South Australia will likely fall in 2014, and won't be re-contested until 2018.
2018-19, then, is the period where any real resurgence will come; there is also a convergence of elections around this time, and, what is more, a Federal Coalition government will be in its second-term, as will most State governments. Now, I believe that ultimately the political cycle will prevail; eventually, governments will change hands. It is a question for the Liberals how long they can extend the cycle, and for Labor how quickly they can contract the Liberal's time in office. Neither is fully in control of events that may benefit them or adversely affect them, and neither is fully in control of their political capital.
The Labor party, as such, will be in the wilderness for sometime. Hopefully, they use that time to reconnect with voters, and engage a bit of internal party reform; otherwise, they may find themselves in the wilderness again very quickly after the alternating trend eventually "flips" in their favour again. That this Labor government will be the first government not to win a third election since Whitlam will cause a disruption in the alternating trend. Since Whitlam, every government has gotten at least a third-term, and this is the major contributing factor to the trend. If any in-coming Liberal government fails to go beyond two-terms, then the trend will change, for at least a decade, to one of corresponding, and not alternating.
This is all hypothetical, of course, but it bears remembering that politics is not just about today, or the next election; our politics, just like our lives, exists in a continuum, and understanding the rhythms and patterns of that continuum is useful for contextualising individual events or phenomena.
Wednesday, 5 June 2013
Democratic Tension and the Australian Electoral System
The illusion of democracy is that it presents us with distinct choices; it does not. There will always be a ruling class which excludes the alternative options enough to limit the range of choices so as to render the impact of choice negligible. The only the complete absence of political parties could ensure genuine choice, but that is an impossibility. Human beings have always grouped together for mutual benefit; tribalism has many forms, from the primitive, to the symbolic, to the political. The essence of democracy is the contest between at least two tribes or partisan groups amongst the ruling class.
One might argue, then, that the ideal state, the state that most approximates the diversity of choice, is a multiparty system. This raises the problem of the tension between stability and diversity. In the absence of genuine choice, democracy resonates with the tension between the stability of governance and the diversity of representation. Multiparty democracies are notoriously unstable, while two-party democracies are notoriously fickle and stifling of difference. In the case of the former, governing alliances risk being undermined by fatal compromise between its participants (fatal, at least, to one of the parties), while the latter often promotes homogeneity, stifling internal dissent for the sake of stability.
There is no ideal circumstance in which parties or politicians come to power where human beings are concerned. At best, we can hope to manage the competing interests of the parties and the tributary groups they primarily represent through keeping them in a perpetual state of tension. In multiparty democracies, such tension is problematic because it may prove to be in a particular party's interest not to engage or compromise with other parties, thereby causing instability in the ever-fragile democratic state. In the two-party system it is almost mandatory not to engage or compromise with the only other competitor in the hope of gaining an outright majority (thereby rendering compromise unnecessary).
Whatever the system, an element of risk must be involved. Democracy is inherently risky; political parties must risk their enduring success, while the nation itself must risk social cohesion for the sake of democratic freedom. The U.S. electoral system represents the worst kind of two-party system, while many European nations, such as Greece, highlight the problems with a multiparty democracy. The U.S. system is moribund, remaining essentially unchanged for more than two centuries; the intransigence of the two major parties is entrenched, and, arguably, representative of a broader social divide in that country. Greece's electoral system is unwieldy, and often results in unstable governing coalitions, a pattern frequently repeated across Europe. Such irregular governance, it can be argued, has contributed to the economic instability of European nations, such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. This, obviously, is a far more complex point than my over-simplification.
The Australian electoral system, I believe, manages to navigate the pitfalls of either extreme relatively well - relatively well. Our system has evolved since Federation, usually with bipartisan and popular support. We have a House of Representatives elected along the lines of the Westminster tradition, as single-member electorates, while our Senate is elected proportionally, as multi-member electorates. Our Senators, furthermore, are elected to "double terms," twice as long as the term of an MP in the Lower House. The particulars of the electoral methods employed can, indeed, be debated, but what is important is the difference in the way the houses are constituted.
In the U.S. the two Houses of Congress are elected in roughly the same manner, with a few variations. Senators there are elected in a similar manner to Congressmen, with two exceptions. First, Senators serve a six-year term, not a two-year term. Second, there are two Senators per state, although Senators from the same state are never elected simultaneously, except in rare occurrences where there is a casual vacancy and the law in that particular state dictates a "special election" to fill the position (usually, casual vacancies are filled at the Governor's discretion). The Senate and the House tend to resemble each other, with the Senate "swinging" a little more slowly than the House from one side to the other.
As is evident, the U.S. Congress is ineffective, partly because of how it is constituted. There are two-parties, and there is no real impetus for compromise; they can just play games and wait for their turn in government. The U.S. Government has, in fact, closed down more than once because of the intransigence between the various arms of government. There is no mechanism for resolving deadlock within Congress, or between Congress and the White House. The two major parties in the U.S. never have to really risk anything; the only thing at stake is who controls the Treasury, and eventually voters get tired of the governing party and just want a change - sometimes "it's time" and there isn't much you can do about it.
The same kind of inertia does exist, to an extent, in Australia. We have two parties who swap seats every now and then. Our system does, however, allow for alternative parties to make their case. There is a rich history of minor political parties changing the political landscape in this country. I have discussed them to some degree here. Even minor political parties that didn't quite take off have been able to influence the discourse. The possibility of winning seats in the Senate (even in the Legislative Councils of a number of states) is enough to promote the third-party alternative.
While most third-parties never win seats, their presence is central to maintaining the democratic tension in our electoral system. Third-parties pose a threat to the major parties. Both major parties have their voting blocs splintered, or threatened with such, from time to time. At present, the Labor vote is effectively splintered by the Greens, although with compulsory preferential voting the worst effects of this are mitigated. Both major parties have, in the past, been splintered from within, but both remain threatened from without as well. Whatever one may think of Bob Brown, Bob Katter, Pauline Hanson, or even Clive Palmer, they represent the tip of the iceberg, so to speak, of the threat the hegemony of the two major parties. Whether their disruptive politics can endure, however, is a different question. Hanson's rise and fall is a case in point.
Other parties, such as the Australian Sex Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, even the Wikileaks Party, represent the vibrant anti-incumbency that our system both enables and needs to maintain the tension. One may cast these minor players aside as "atmosphere," contributing colour and movement to the main game, but it is dangerous to be so flippant, given our political history. What is more, roughly one in five voters vote for a minor party in the Senate; in 2010, that rose to almost 30%, whether this "peak" is repeated at the next election is debatable.
It isn't just the major parties that are "at risk," if that's even the right term. Minor parties are, almost by definition, always at risk, and never more so than when they achieve political success. The balance of power in the Senate is a powerful but perilous position; in its 60-odd year history, it has seen off two "major" minor parties who attained to its influence. The DLP and the Democrats were both punished for their perceived indiscretions while holding the balance. What is perilous for minor parties like these when they do attain a level of influence is that they are more vulnerable to the consequences of compromise. The Democrats, for instance, suffered greatly for negotiating with the Howard Coalition government on the GST. The DLP were obliterated in 1974 for their intransigence towards the Whitlam government. It is hard to say if the Greens will suffer a similar fate to their predecessors. Minor parties are not as robust as their major counterparts. Put simply, they have no base that will vote for them no matter what they do - this may be the exception that saves the Greens, only time will tell.
What will be interesting about the upcoming election will be the influence of some of the more high-profile minor parties (mentioned above). I suspect that the third-party vote will exceed 25%, at least on the Senate ballot. With two deeply unpopular leaders, and two political parties that are descending to cartel-status, the upcoming election will actually be a test of voters' political comprehension, as well as of their willingness to act on their diminishing perception of the two major parties. There's no point complaining about the Big Two if you aren't willing to put your vote on the line. Labor and the Coalition will only respond to voter disaffection if there is a risk of losing those voters. The forthcoming election is not so much a test of the two leaders - neither is wanted - but rather a test of voters and the tensile strength of our democracy.
One might argue, then, that the ideal state, the state that most approximates the diversity of choice, is a multiparty system. This raises the problem of the tension between stability and diversity. In the absence of genuine choice, democracy resonates with the tension between the stability of governance and the diversity of representation. Multiparty democracies are notoriously unstable, while two-party democracies are notoriously fickle and stifling of difference. In the case of the former, governing alliances risk being undermined by fatal compromise between its participants (fatal, at least, to one of the parties), while the latter often promotes homogeneity, stifling internal dissent for the sake of stability.
There is no ideal circumstance in which parties or politicians come to power where human beings are concerned. At best, we can hope to manage the competing interests of the parties and the tributary groups they primarily represent through keeping them in a perpetual state of tension. In multiparty democracies, such tension is problematic because it may prove to be in a particular party's interest not to engage or compromise with other parties, thereby causing instability in the ever-fragile democratic state. In the two-party system it is almost mandatory not to engage or compromise with the only other competitor in the hope of gaining an outright majority (thereby rendering compromise unnecessary).
Whatever the system, an element of risk must be involved. Democracy is inherently risky; political parties must risk their enduring success, while the nation itself must risk social cohesion for the sake of democratic freedom. The U.S. electoral system represents the worst kind of two-party system, while many European nations, such as Greece, highlight the problems with a multiparty democracy. The U.S. system is moribund, remaining essentially unchanged for more than two centuries; the intransigence of the two major parties is entrenched, and, arguably, representative of a broader social divide in that country. Greece's electoral system is unwieldy, and often results in unstable governing coalitions, a pattern frequently repeated across Europe. Such irregular governance, it can be argued, has contributed to the economic instability of European nations, such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. This, obviously, is a far more complex point than my over-simplification.
The Australian electoral system, I believe, manages to navigate the pitfalls of either extreme relatively well - relatively well. Our system has evolved since Federation, usually with bipartisan and popular support. We have a House of Representatives elected along the lines of the Westminster tradition, as single-member electorates, while our Senate is elected proportionally, as multi-member electorates. Our Senators, furthermore, are elected to "double terms," twice as long as the term of an MP in the Lower House. The particulars of the electoral methods employed can, indeed, be debated, but what is important is the difference in the way the houses are constituted.
In the U.S. the two Houses of Congress are elected in roughly the same manner, with a few variations. Senators there are elected in a similar manner to Congressmen, with two exceptions. First, Senators serve a six-year term, not a two-year term. Second, there are two Senators per state, although Senators from the same state are never elected simultaneously, except in rare occurrences where there is a casual vacancy and the law in that particular state dictates a "special election" to fill the position (usually, casual vacancies are filled at the Governor's discretion). The Senate and the House tend to resemble each other, with the Senate "swinging" a little more slowly than the House from one side to the other.
As is evident, the U.S. Congress is ineffective, partly because of how it is constituted. There are two-parties, and there is no real impetus for compromise; they can just play games and wait for their turn in government. The U.S. Government has, in fact, closed down more than once because of the intransigence between the various arms of government. There is no mechanism for resolving deadlock within Congress, or between Congress and the White House. The two major parties in the U.S. never have to really risk anything; the only thing at stake is who controls the Treasury, and eventually voters get tired of the governing party and just want a change - sometimes "it's time" and there isn't much you can do about it.
The same kind of inertia does exist, to an extent, in Australia. We have two parties who swap seats every now and then. Our system does, however, allow for alternative parties to make their case. There is a rich history of minor political parties changing the political landscape in this country. I have discussed them to some degree here. Even minor political parties that didn't quite take off have been able to influence the discourse. The possibility of winning seats in the Senate (even in the Legislative Councils of a number of states) is enough to promote the third-party alternative.
While most third-parties never win seats, their presence is central to maintaining the democratic tension in our electoral system. Third-parties pose a threat to the major parties. Both major parties have their voting blocs splintered, or threatened with such, from time to time. At present, the Labor vote is effectively splintered by the Greens, although with compulsory preferential voting the worst effects of this are mitigated. Both major parties have, in the past, been splintered from within, but both remain threatened from without as well. Whatever one may think of Bob Brown, Bob Katter, Pauline Hanson, or even Clive Palmer, they represent the tip of the iceberg, so to speak, of the threat the hegemony of the two major parties. Whether their disruptive politics can endure, however, is a different question. Hanson's rise and fall is a case in point.
Other parties, such as the Australian Sex Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, even the Wikileaks Party, represent the vibrant anti-incumbency that our system both enables and needs to maintain the tension. One may cast these minor players aside as "atmosphere," contributing colour and movement to the main game, but it is dangerous to be so flippant, given our political history. What is more, roughly one in five voters vote for a minor party in the Senate; in 2010, that rose to almost 30%, whether this "peak" is repeated at the next election is debatable.
It isn't just the major parties that are "at risk," if that's even the right term. Minor parties are, almost by definition, always at risk, and never more so than when they achieve political success. The balance of power in the Senate is a powerful but perilous position; in its 60-odd year history, it has seen off two "major" minor parties who attained to its influence. The DLP and the Democrats were both punished for their perceived indiscretions while holding the balance. What is perilous for minor parties like these when they do attain a level of influence is that they are more vulnerable to the consequences of compromise. The Democrats, for instance, suffered greatly for negotiating with the Howard Coalition government on the GST. The DLP were obliterated in 1974 for their intransigence towards the Whitlam government. It is hard to say if the Greens will suffer a similar fate to their predecessors. Minor parties are not as robust as their major counterparts. Put simply, they have no base that will vote for them no matter what they do - this may be the exception that saves the Greens, only time will tell.
What will be interesting about the upcoming election will be the influence of some of the more high-profile minor parties (mentioned above). I suspect that the third-party vote will exceed 25%, at least on the Senate ballot. With two deeply unpopular leaders, and two political parties that are descending to cartel-status, the upcoming election will actually be a test of voters' political comprehension, as well as of their willingness to act on their diminishing perception of the two major parties. There's no point complaining about the Big Two if you aren't willing to put your vote on the line. Labor and the Coalition will only respond to voter disaffection if there is a risk of losing those voters. The forthcoming election is not so much a test of the two leaders - neither is wanted - but rather a test of voters and the tensile strength of our democracy.
Saturday, 13 April 2013
The Death of the ALP
Much is said and written about the demise of the Australian Labor Party. But it is said with an ignorance of history. Whatever else you may think of the ALP, and more broadly the Left of politics, the Labor Party is a great Aussie battler. The ALP is the oldest political party in Australia by a wide margin; it has suffered internal schisms and ructions that would have decimated other parties. Prior to the intervention of Sir. Robert Menzies, the conservative, or at least non-Labor, side of politics disintegrated every time it lost an election; prior to Menzies, the non-Labor side of politics, in its various party guises, often anointed to senior positions, and therefore relied upon, former Labor Party members. Three non-Labor Prime Ministers, in fact, were former Labor party members. One was, in fact, a founding member of the party; another a serving Labor Prime Minister at the time! This is a testament both to the turbulence that the ALP has always suffered from, but also the pre-Menzies turbulence experienced by the conservative parties. Whatever else you may think of Menzies, he changed irrevocably the path of Australian politics. But that's for another day.
The two Prime Ministers to whom I referred above are Joseph Cook and Billy Hughes, respectively. Joseph Lyons was the third. Joseph Cook was a notorious "party hopper"; having helped found the Labor Party, he would later move on to the Free-Trade Party, then the Commonwealth Liberal Party (after which the current Liberal Party is named), and when that party collapsed he joined the Nationalist Party that replaced it. Billy Hughes was Prime Minister when he switched parties over the issue of conscription from Labor to Nationalist (with Cook as his Deputy). Joseph Lyons was elected as a Labor Party member but resigned from the party, crossed the floor, and with the remaining Nationalists (then in opposition), formed the United Australia Party (which Robert Menzies would eventually lead to electoral oblivion before starting the modern-day Liberal Party). Interestingly, Hughes would serve as a Minister in Lyons UAP government. Hughes would eventually return as leader of the UAP in opposition (after Menzies had lost government through the machinations of the last federal hung parliament) and led that party to defeat, and its final election.
Jack Lang, Labor Premier of NSW in the late 20s and early 30s, and, other than Gough Whitlam, leader of the only government to be sacked by the Queen's Representative, is another notable figure in the tumultuous history of the ALP. "Lang Labor," the collective title for the various breakaway parties led by Lang, ran candidates independently of the central party at a number of federal elections in the 30s and 40s. Lang, along with the likes of Billy Hughes, are characters in Australia political history that are worth knowing about. Lang was a particularly radical individual who, among other things, supported the repudiation of foreign debt; that is, he supported not paying foreign creditors the money that was owed to them. For Lang, this was a way of alleviating some of the financial difficulties wrought by the Great Depression. Lang's intransigence as Premier helped bring down the Federal Labor government led by James Scullin, whom Joseph Lyons would replace as the first UAP Prime Minister (are we beginning to see a picture?). In fact, Lang Labor in the Federal parliament crossed the floor and voted with the UAP in a no-confidence motion in 1931 to bring Scullin down.
This is all pre-Menzies Liberal-era stuff, of course. One would think that the ALP would have gotten its stuff together after the chaos of the first half of the 20th Century. Not so. The Lang split can be seen as a precursor for a later split that would see the ALP out of power federally for 23 years. Lang, while quite radical, was nonetheless anti-communist. One of Lang Labor's incarnations was the "Australian Labor Party (Non-Communist)." It contested only one election (1940). Later, there would emerge the "Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist)," no affiliation to Lang, however. This party would eventually become known as the Democratic Labor Party, or DLP. The DLP emerged from the "great split" of 1955, and would become the first "minor party" in modern Australian political history (proportional-preferential voting was only brought in 6 years earlier). The DLP would help keep Menzies and the Liberal-Country (now National) Party Coalition in power for 23 years. The Coalition would win nine consecutive elections, from 1949 to 1969. During this time, the DLP preferenced Liberal candidates ahead of ALP candidates. To illustrate the significance of the DLP's influence, in three elections in this period, 1954, 1961, and 1969, the ALP actually won the primary and two-party vote. The DLP also held the balance of power in the Senate at various points during this time.
Then, of course, there was the infamous "Dismissal" of the Whitlam government in 1975, perhaps the most famous political crisis in Australia's short history. The dismissal was followed by a massive electoral defeat (although, in raw numbers of seats lost, not the worst defeat for Labor of all time). Added to this was the indignity of opposition during Fraser's "double majority"; that is, a majority in the House as well as the Senate. For two consecutive terms, Fraser held a massive margin in the House, and a slim majority in the Senate from 1975-1980 - a rare feat since 1949. The only time this has happened since then is in 2004-2007 when John Howard held a one-seat majority in the Senate. One could point to the historical Hawke-Keating tenure as a the silver-lining for Labor; perhaps a dramatic change of fortunes. 13 years in government is by far the longest continuous period of time Labor has ever spent in power federally. This, however, is not the focus of this blog. I believe that the current maladies afflicting the Labor Party have their roots in this period of success, but I will deal with that in another blog.
My point is this: the Labor Party is a survivor - it is a survivor largely of self-inflicted wounds, but it has nevertheless survived more than 100 years of internal fracturing, disintegration, and reformation. What is currently happening to the Labor Party is not new - it's not even the worst the party has gone through. Again, I will deal with the underlying causes of the current problems in another post. But it is important to understand history to know how robust the ALP is - but it is also important to understand Labor's Phoenix-like nature: conflagration followed by rebirth. No other party does it better. To be fair, no other party would be crazy enough to try! Arguably, were it not for the influence of Sir Robert Menzies, the conservative, or non-Labor, side of politics would still be stuck in its own cycle of destruction and rebirth.
You might then wonder what the point is if the party is forever devouring itself: "what is to be achieved from such violent self-harm?" However self-destructive the ALP can get, it has nevertheless achieved vital reforms for Australia; it almost kills itself doing it, but it does it. In the area of health, as a prime example, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, which so many of us rely on for affordable medication, was introduced by Chifley; Medicare by Whitlam (or its forerunner Medibank, which would be replaced by Medicare under Hawke). Initiatives such as the National Disability Insurance Scheme and Dentacare belong to this line of Labor reforms. The successful 1946 Referendum, which introduced new social services, also came under the stewardship of a Labor government. Free tertiary education, which was later replaced with the HECS program by the Hawke-Keating governments (ostensibly, to make the system more sustainable), was introduced by Whitlam. Many of the institutions we rely on today stem from Labor initiatives.
Whatever you may think of the ALP, it has managed to survive; longevity in Australian politics is a mark of success. Question may arise as to whether, in the new "Information Age" that a political party can carry on this way; after all, we are no privy to the machinations of politics now more than ever, and with the advent of social media we have greater access to our politics, and they to us. There does appear to be some fragmentation in federal politics more broadly. Membership of the major parties has been eroded over time, and there is a solid third-party vote in Australia (although this vote is divided among dozens of small parties, which dilutes the strength of any anti-incumbency attitude at present). Both major parties try to maintain strict control over their parliamentary members, and this is can cause tension which is always preyed upon by the media. With greater media and public scrutiny, such tensions are exacerbated. What the Information Age holds for our political dynasties I can only speculate, but one should not doubt the resilience of the Labor Party.
The two Prime Ministers to whom I referred above are Joseph Cook and Billy Hughes, respectively. Joseph Lyons was the third. Joseph Cook was a notorious "party hopper"; having helped found the Labor Party, he would later move on to the Free-Trade Party, then the Commonwealth Liberal Party (after which the current Liberal Party is named), and when that party collapsed he joined the Nationalist Party that replaced it. Billy Hughes was Prime Minister when he switched parties over the issue of conscription from Labor to Nationalist (with Cook as his Deputy). Joseph Lyons was elected as a Labor Party member but resigned from the party, crossed the floor, and with the remaining Nationalists (then in opposition), formed the United Australia Party (which Robert Menzies would eventually lead to electoral oblivion before starting the modern-day Liberal Party). Interestingly, Hughes would serve as a Minister in Lyons UAP government. Hughes would eventually return as leader of the UAP in opposition (after Menzies had lost government through the machinations of the last federal hung parliament) and led that party to defeat, and its final election.
Jack Lang, Labor Premier of NSW in the late 20s and early 30s, and, other than Gough Whitlam, leader of the only government to be sacked by the Queen's Representative, is another notable figure in the tumultuous history of the ALP. "Lang Labor," the collective title for the various breakaway parties led by Lang, ran candidates independently of the central party at a number of federal elections in the 30s and 40s. Lang, along with the likes of Billy Hughes, are characters in Australia political history that are worth knowing about. Lang was a particularly radical individual who, among other things, supported the repudiation of foreign debt; that is, he supported not paying foreign creditors the money that was owed to them. For Lang, this was a way of alleviating some of the financial difficulties wrought by the Great Depression. Lang's intransigence as Premier helped bring down the Federal Labor government led by James Scullin, whom Joseph Lyons would replace as the first UAP Prime Minister (are we beginning to see a picture?). In fact, Lang Labor in the Federal parliament crossed the floor and voted with the UAP in a no-confidence motion in 1931 to bring Scullin down.
This is all pre-Menzies Liberal-era stuff, of course. One would think that the ALP would have gotten its stuff together after the chaos of the first half of the 20th Century. Not so. The Lang split can be seen as a precursor for a later split that would see the ALP out of power federally for 23 years. Lang, while quite radical, was nonetheless anti-communist. One of Lang Labor's incarnations was the "Australian Labor Party (Non-Communist)." It contested only one election (1940). Later, there would emerge the "Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist)," no affiliation to Lang, however. This party would eventually become known as the Democratic Labor Party, or DLP. The DLP emerged from the "great split" of 1955, and would become the first "minor party" in modern Australian political history (proportional-preferential voting was only brought in 6 years earlier). The DLP would help keep Menzies and the Liberal-Country (now National) Party Coalition in power for 23 years. The Coalition would win nine consecutive elections, from 1949 to 1969. During this time, the DLP preferenced Liberal candidates ahead of ALP candidates. To illustrate the significance of the DLP's influence, in three elections in this period, 1954, 1961, and 1969, the ALP actually won the primary and two-party vote. The DLP also held the balance of power in the Senate at various points during this time.
Then, of course, there was the infamous "Dismissal" of the Whitlam government in 1975, perhaps the most famous political crisis in Australia's short history. The dismissal was followed by a massive electoral defeat (although, in raw numbers of seats lost, not the worst defeat for Labor of all time). Added to this was the indignity of opposition during Fraser's "double majority"; that is, a majority in the House as well as the Senate. For two consecutive terms, Fraser held a massive margin in the House, and a slim majority in the Senate from 1975-1980 - a rare feat since 1949. The only time this has happened since then is in 2004-2007 when John Howard held a one-seat majority in the Senate. One could point to the historical Hawke-Keating tenure as a the silver-lining for Labor; perhaps a dramatic change of fortunes. 13 years in government is by far the longest continuous period of time Labor has ever spent in power federally. This, however, is not the focus of this blog. I believe that the current maladies afflicting the Labor Party have their roots in this period of success, but I will deal with that in another blog.
My point is this: the Labor Party is a survivor - it is a survivor largely of self-inflicted wounds, but it has nevertheless survived more than 100 years of internal fracturing, disintegration, and reformation. What is currently happening to the Labor Party is not new - it's not even the worst the party has gone through. Again, I will deal with the underlying causes of the current problems in another post. But it is important to understand history to know how robust the ALP is - but it is also important to understand Labor's Phoenix-like nature: conflagration followed by rebirth. No other party does it better. To be fair, no other party would be crazy enough to try! Arguably, were it not for the influence of Sir Robert Menzies, the conservative, or non-Labor, side of politics would still be stuck in its own cycle of destruction and rebirth.
You might then wonder what the point is if the party is forever devouring itself: "what is to be achieved from such violent self-harm?" However self-destructive the ALP can get, it has nevertheless achieved vital reforms for Australia; it almost kills itself doing it, but it does it. In the area of health, as a prime example, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, which so many of us rely on for affordable medication, was introduced by Chifley; Medicare by Whitlam (or its forerunner Medibank, which would be replaced by Medicare under Hawke). Initiatives such as the National Disability Insurance Scheme and Dentacare belong to this line of Labor reforms. The successful 1946 Referendum, which introduced new social services, also came under the stewardship of a Labor government. Free tertiary education, which was later replaced with the HECS program by the Hawke-Keating governments (ostensibly, to make the system more sustainable), was introduced by Whitlam. Many of the institutions we rely on today stem from Labor initiatives.
Whatever you may think of the ALP, it has managed to survive; longevity in Australian politics is a mark of success. Question may arise as to whether, in the new "Information Age" that a political party can carry on this way; after all, we are no privy to the machinations of politics now more than ever, and with the advent of social media we have greater access to our politics, and they to us. There does appear to be some fragmentation in federal politics more broadly. Membership of the major parties has been eroded over time, and there is a solid third-party vote in Australia (although this vote is divided among dozens of small parties, which dilutes the strength of any anti-incumbency attitude at present). Both major parties try to maintain strict control over their parliamentary members, and this is can cause tension which is always preyed upon by the media. With greater media and public scrutiny, such tensions are exacerbated. What the Information Age holds for our political dynasties I can only speculate, but one should not doubt the resilience of the Labor Party.
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